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Abstract—Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) operators
provide model training and prediction on the cloud. MLaaS
applications often rely on centralised collection and aggregation
of user data, which could lead to significant privacy concerns
when dealing with sensitive personal data. To address this prob-
lem, we propose PrivEdge, a technique for privacy-preserving
MLaaS that safeguards the privacy of users who provide their
data for training, as well as users who use the prediction
service. With PrivEdge, each user independently uses their
private data to locally train a one-class reconstructive adversarial
network that succinctly represents their training data. As sending
the model parameters to the service provider in the clear
would reveal private information, PrivEdge secret-shares the
parameters among two non-colluding MLaaS providers, to then
provide cryptographically private prediction services through
secure multi-party computation techniques. We quantify the
benefits of PrivEdge and compare its performance with state-of-
the-art centralised architectures on three privacy-sensitive image-
based tasks: individual identification, writer identification, and
handwritten letter recognition. Experimental results show that
PrivEdge has high precision and recall in preserving privacy,
as well as in distinguishing between private and non-private
images. Moreover, we show the robustness of PrivEdge to
image compression and biased training data. The source code
is available at https://github.com/smartcameras/PrivEdge.
Index Terms—Distributed Learning, Privacy, One-Class Clas-
sifier, Generative Adversarial Network, Multi-Party Computation
I. INTRODUCTION
MACHINE Learning as a Service (MLaaS) is increas-ingly adopted in a range of applications including
authentication through signature [1], access control through
face recognition [2], [3], and annotation of pictures in social
media [4]. The need to train machine learning models from
user data, such as images, increases the risk of privacy vio-
lations [5], [6]. A privacy violation may arise when a service
provider or a user learns private information of another user
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from the data or model parameters during either training or
prediction.
The training of MLaaS applications can be centralised [7],
[8] or distributed [9]–[13]. In centralised learning, the ser-
vice provider collects all users’ data to train a model. To
preserve privacy, local data anonymisation [7], [8] or data
encryption [14] can be performed on the user side, prior to
transmission to the service provider. However, the curse of
dimensionality may render these approaches impractical [15].
In addition to this, encryption may be needed to approxi-
mate the model, thus reducing accuracy [14]. In distributed
learning, the service provider trains a model by iteratively
aggregating the parameters or gradients of models trained
locally by users [9]–[11]. If the models trained on private
data are shared among users or with the service provider
in the clear, the privacy of each user in the training may
be violated by other users who may be honest-but-curious
(i.e. honest in performing the operations, but also attempting to
learn information about other users by analysing the received
information [16]) or by an honest-but-curious service provider
during training or prediction [13], [17]–[19]. Finally, in dis-
tributed learning methods [9]–[11], [13], users are assumed
to have access to the data of several classes with machine
learning models that forget previously learned information
upon learning new information (catastrophic forgetting) [20],
[21].
Distributed one-class learning addresses honest-but-curious
users and catastrophic forgetting issues in applications such
as image-sharing social media [5], where each user has data
of one class (e.g. their face), by decomposing the multi-class
classifier into a set of one-class classifiers, which are trained
locally [12]. However, users need to train their classifier using
a public feature extractor, trained by the service provider,
which could use it to extract private information. Moreover, the
service provider needs to collect data for training the feature
extractor, which may be difficult when dealing with private
data. More importantly, the service provider has access to the
parameters of all local models as they are uploaded in the
clear.
To address these problems and enable privacy-preserving
MLaaS, we propose PrivEdge, a technique that not only
preserves the privacy of users participating in the training, but
also the privacy of users that submit their data to a prediction
service. The users and the service provider do not exchange
data nor model parameters in the clear during training or
prediction1. We model each user as a distinct class and propose
1Note that PrivEdge reveals the classification output and therefore does not
protect against membership inference attacks [22] and model extraction [23].
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2one-class Reconstructive Adversarial Networks (RANs) that
enable users to perform private training locally without a
public pre-trained feature extractor, unlike recent distributed
learning work [12].
A RAN reconstructs private images via an autoencoder
aided by a discriminator network trained to differentiate be-
tween output and input of the autoencoder. Importantly, a user
can join the framework at any time by training their one-class
RAN. For private prediction, we assume that a non-colluding
regulator is available and use the 2-server model of Multi-
Party Computation (MPC) [24]. A 2-Party Computation (2PC)
protocol2 is secure if the two participating parties can only
learn something that can be computed based on their input
and output. Then, the regulator aids in the computation while
learning nothing from the private data [24], [26]–[28]. In our
scenario (inference of one-class classifiers), two parties either
compute a multiplication between layers, or do a comparison
for computing the activation function3. Our 2PC protocol
involves a Yao’s garbled circuit implementation of the Leaky
Rectifier Linear Unit (L-ReLU) activation function [29], [30].
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. We
begin by describing methods that can provide private training
or prediction in Section II. In Section III, we describe the
problem followed by discussing our setting and threat model.
In Sections IV and V, we describe in detail the private
training and prediction of PrivEdge. In Section VI, we discuss
the evaluation on three real-world privacy-sensitive datasets.
Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
Private training and prediction for MLaaS applications
can be addressed by applying cryptography tools such as
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) [31] and Multi-Party
Computation (MPC) [32], as well as information theory and
differential privacy [33].
FHE [31] encrypts data to enable anyone to perform arbi-
trary functions on the encrypted data without compromising
the encryption. FHE is computationally expensive and, despite
recent advances [34]–[37], training a machine learning clas-
sifier (e.g. a Deep Neural Network, DNN) using FHE is still
unfeasible. A weaker (i.e. partially homomorphic) version of
FHE, Additively Homomorphic Encryption (AHE), was used
for distributed learning to protect the parameters via encryp-
tion before sending them to the service provider [13]. When
the encryption scheme is homomorphic to addition, the service
provider can add, without decryption, encrypted parameters
of all users and fine-tune the global DNN classifier [13].
Users can then decrypt the global encrypted parameters to
fine-tune them locally on their data. Trusting the users is a
critical assumption in this approach, as intermediate results in
the computation (i.e. the gradients) are revealed to the users.
Moreover, an honest-but-curious service provider could span
a fake user to achieve the same goal. Finally, the parameters
2Yao’s millionaires’ problem [25] is an example of secure 2PC wanting to
determine which party is richer, without disclosing to each other their wealth
(i.e. values of their input).
3The same as the one in the millionaires’ problem [25].
for the encryption must be generated by a party that does
not collude with the service provider, to prevent the service
provider accessing the parameters in the clear. CryptoNets [38]
and TAPAS [39] do private prediction using homomorphic
encryption. Apart from their expensive computations, Cryp-
toNets and TAPAS may negatively affect the accuracy of the
prediction by changing the structure of the model, replacing
the non-linear activation functions (e.g. Rectifier linear unit,
and Sigmoid) with polynomial functions in the CryptoNets,
and binarising the parameters in TAPAS.
The ability of a service provider to access private data
beyond what the model outputs can be limited using alternative
approaches based on MPC [32]. MPC has scalability issues,
as it needs a large number of communication rounds to run
interactive protocols between each pair of parties for each gate
in the circuit4 [40]. To address these issues, the so-called
2-server MPC model can be used [24], [26]–[28]. The 2-
server MPC model involves a third-party (e.g. another service
provider) that is trusted not to collude with the service provider
when performing the training procedure in a cryptographically
secure 2PC protocol. In practice, collusion does not occur,
especially in cloud computing, as service providers do not
have incentive for cooperation [41]. Collusion is either too
costly (not feasible) for service providers, or prevented by
regulations or physical means (e.g. ballot boxes [42], mediator
model [43]). The training is run as a secure protocol by
modifying DNNs and approximating their non-linear layers
with polynomial functions, thus negatively impacting accuracy.
Although MPC is faster than FHE, training is still time con-
suming. For example, the offline phase of SecureML [24] for
a simple fully-connected DNN with 2 hidden layers takes ∼3
days on two Amazon EC2 c4.8xlarge machines running Linux.
The prediction, however, is significantly faster, requiring less
than 5 seconds in total. For these reasons, MPC techniques
are used for private prediction [44]–[47], but the cost of
communication between parties remains as a major bottleneck.
In contrast to FHE and MPC, which fully encrypt the data to
request a prediction, users could remove the private informa-
tion from data and only send extracted features to the service
provider. A feature extractor can be obtained by solving an
optimisation problem that maximises the mutual information
between the feature set and non-sensitive variables, while
minimising mutual information between the feature set and
private variables [15], [48], [49].
Differential privacy [33], [50]–[53] can obfuscate infor-
mation that determine the presence (or absence) of data
about an individual in the training dataset during training or
prediction. The prediction of differentially private distributed
learning [11] is private as users can query the differentially
private model locally. However, applying differential privacy
negatively affects accuracy [54].
In summary, state-of-the-art private training methods using
FHE, MPC or differential privacy have high computational and
communications costs, and reduce the model accuracy [54].
We tackle these issues by ensuring that the training can be
4Consider representing functions with arithmetic or Boolean circuit includ-
ing gates.
3done locally by each user in the clear using our proposed
one-class classifier, which does not require interaction with
other users. We use MPC techniques, which have significant
overhead, only for prediction and to avoid revealing parameters
of the trained model and the users’ query data to the service
provider.
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND THREAT MODEL
In this section we formulate the problem, describe our
setting and the capabilities of the adversaries that PrivEdge
can withstand.
Let us define an image as private if it includes content such
as the face or handwritten text of an individual. Let us consider
the MLaaS task of predicting whether an image X submitted to
the service provider by each user un is an image with private
content of user ui, where i = 1, ..., N , i 6= n, and N is
the total number of users who decided to protect their private
images.
The service provider aims to build an N -class classifier
using training data contributed by N users, to decide whether
a new image belongs to one of the private classes. Let
Xi = {Xi,1, ...,Xi,j , ...,Xi,Ki},
be a set of private images of user ui, where Ki ∈ N, and
Xˆi = {Xˆi,1, ..., Xˆi,j , ..., Xˆi,Kˆi},
be a set of non-private images, where Kˆi ∈ N. The cardinality
of the two sets, Ki and Kˆi, may differ considerably across
users.
To avoid disclosing private images of a user or the model
parameters of the classifier to other users or to the service
provider, the training phase of the multi-class classifier must
be private. The privacy of the users must also be preserved
in the prediction phase, by keeping the model and images
private until they are classified as non-private and, for example,
shared on social media. In the case of privacy-preserving
image-sharing MLaaS, users shall be able to control what
images about themselves are shared by others. In this context,
preserving the privacy of a user means preventing other users
from uploading private images of others. In this case, classes
are disjoint and private across users. Moreover, the ideal
solution should prevent the service provider and other users
from learning private information from images of a user5.
In PrivEdge, N users u1, ..., un, ..., uN train the model,
while the service provider and the regulator do the prediction
without further involvement of the users in the computations.
In our threat model, an arbitrarily large number of parties
including the service provider and users might collude to try
to recover information about a particular user during training.
Note that we do not put any computational restrictions on such
an adversary. This threat model is too strong to be satisfied
using MPC techniques, as it requires information theoretic
guarantees under unbounded collusions [55].
We address this strong threat model by ensuring that the
training phase is performed locally by each user, and such local
5Consider for example the case of Facebook that asked users for their
private images to use as training set [5].
computation does not involve data from other users. Therefore,
most of the complexity of PrivEdge is in the prediction phase,
as in this phase the data from different users is combined.
In the prediction phase, we rely on an external honest-but-
curious party, which we call regulator. The regulator does not
collude with the service provider and aids in the computation
without accessing input data. In the prediction phase, we
assume honest-but-curious parties and arbitrary collusions,
except for the regulator and the service provider (as stated
in Section I). This enables the so-called 2-server model of
MPC [24], [26]–[28]. As above, we model privacy in a secure
computation sense, by enforcing that nothing but the result
of the computation is revealed. This is formalised in the
simulation framework of MPC [32]. Hence, in our setting
the computation must reveal the predicted class or a special
unknown class, and nothing else.
In PrivEdge, we achieve protection against the adversaries
defined above by ensuring that an honest-but-curious user, who
can collude with any subsets of the users and at most one
of two service providers, learns nothing about the inference
of the one-class classifiers beyond those classifiers and the
assigned classes corresponding to the users with whom they
are colluding.
As MPC does not impose any constraints on the parameters
provided by users, an honest-but-curious user may learn an
identity function (i.e. perfect reconstruction of any input
image) with their own one-class classifier in order to assign
any image to them. To the best of our knowledge, an identity
function can only be learned by an over-complete autoencoder
in which the dimensions of the hidden layers are equal to or
larger than the input and output layers. We design each one-
class RAN with an under-complete autoencoder, which com-
presses the images in addition to verifying users’ architectures
with the service provider. Proving the impossibility of copying
the input of the under-complete autoencoder to the output layer
is an important avenue for future work.
IV. PRIVATE TRAINING
An N -class classifier can be decomposed into N classifiers
via binary [56] or one-class decomposition [57]. A binary
decomposition tends to fail when only data of one class
are available [57]–[59]. Instead, one-class classifiers (or data
descriptors) [60] learn to distinguish the target class from
outlier classes (unavailable training subsets) via density es-
timation [61], closed boundary estimation [62]–[64] or data
reconstruction [65].
We propose to learn the reconstruction descriptor of private
images by training a one-class RAN composed of a recon-
structor and a discriminator. The one-class RAN reconstructs
images of users by minimising reconstruction and adver-
sary losses. While our architecture is inspired by Generative
Adversarial Networks (GANs) [66], in the sense that the
discriminator is similar to that in GANs, the reconstructor has
three major differences from a standard GAN generator. First,
the input of the reconstructor is a set of images, as opposed to
noise. Second, the reconstructor aims to reconstruct the input,
i.e. making input and output images similar. Third, we replace
4the negative log-likelihood objectives by a mean square loss
for increased stability during training and better quality of the
reconstructed images [67].
We instantiate the discriminator of each user ui, Di(·) :
Rw×h×c → {0, 1}d (where w is the input width, h is the
input height, and c is the number of input channels) with a
deep convolutional binary classifier (d = 2) parametrised by
WDi = {W
p
Di ∈ R
wk×hk×cp×cp+1 : p = 1, .., P},
where wk is the kernel width, hk is the kernel height, and
cp and cp+1 are the number of feature channels in the p-
th and (p + 1)-th convolutional layers. Each reconstructor
Ri(·) : Rw×h×c → Rw×h×c is instantiated with a T -layer deep
convolutional autoencoder [68], [69] composed of a parametric
encoder, followed by a parametric decoder
WRi = {WtRi ∈ R
wk×hk×ct×ct+1 : t = 1, .., T}.
The encoder maps images into a compressed set of features,
while the decoder reconstructs the images from the set of
features extracted by the encoder.
In the training phase, each user ui trains their one-class
RAN, Mi = (Ri(·),Di(·)), on their private image set, Xi, by
alternating between learning parameters for the discriminator
and the reconstructor until convergence.
To learn the final parameters of Ri(·) in each iteration, W ∗Ri ,
user ui fixes the parameters of Di(·) and minimises the loss
function, which includes two terms, reconstruction loss Lr and
adversary loss La, based on WRi , using the mini-batch Adam
optimiser [70]:
W ∗Ri = arg minWRi
(
γLr
(
Xi,j , X¯i,j
)
+ βLa
(
X¯i,j ,y
j
f
))
, (1)
where γ and β are the hyper-parameters that control the trade-
off between the effects of the reconstruction and adversary
losses on the parameters of the reconstructor. X¯i,j ∈ Rw×h×c
is the reconstructed image of the same size as the input image
Xi,j
X¯i,j = Ri(WRi ,Xi,j),
and Y jf denotes their fake labels as:
Yf = {yjf ∈ Rd : j = 1, ..,Ki}.
The reconstruction loss, Lr, measures how well the private
images of each ui are reconstructed by Ri(·) through com-
puting the mean square error between the input images, Xi,j ,
and the reconstructed images, X¯i,j :
Lr =
1
Kid
Ki∑
j=1
d=w×h×c∑
l=1
(
xi,j(l)− x¯i,j(l)
)2
,
where xi,j(l) and x¯i,j(l) are the l-th elements of image Xi,j
and the reconstructed image X¯i,j , respectively.
The adversary loss, La, is the mean square error between
the label of X¯i,j predicted by the discriminator,
y¯jp = D(WDi , X¯i,j),
and the fake label of the reconstructed images, yjf , as:
La =
1
Ki
Ki∑
j=1
(
y¯jp − yjf
)2
.
Hence, assuming a fixed WDi and optimising Equation 1
enable user ui to reconstruct the images through Ri(·) in a
way that Di(·) cannot distinguish the reconstructed images
from the original images.
The final set of parameters of Di(·) in this iteration, W ∗Di ,
are learned by solving the following optimisation problem
based on WDi , while WRi are fixed, using a mini-batch Adam
optimiser:
W ∗Di = arg minWDi
1
2Ki
Ki∑
j=1
((
y¯jp − yjr
)2
+
(
yjp − yj
)2)
, (2)
where yjr and y
j are the real labels of reconstructed image
X¯i,j and image Xi,j , respectively, and
yjp = D(WDi ,Xi,j).
Hence, Di(·) predicts whether an image comes from the set
of input images or the set of reconstructed images.
The next step optimises Equation 1 and Equation 2 based on
the updated parameters from the current step. The parameters
of the one-class classifiers are then secret-shared with the
service provider and regulator. To this end, each user ui secret-
shares with the service provider and regulator only the set
of parameters of the trained reconstructor6, W ∗Ri , using an
additive secret sharing scheme.
Overall, in PrivEdge, the private training of a multi-class
classifier is reduced to each user training the proposed one-
class RAN locally, independent of other users and even the
service provider. The main advantage of the proposed local
one-class RAN is providing a faster and more accurate pri-
vate training than that of encrypted or differentially private
distributed learning methods. In fact, with the proposed local
training, users employ their data in the clear using fast
computational resources (e.g. GPUs), without communicating
to others or adding noise to the parameters.
V. PRIVATE PREDICTION
The goal of the prediction phase is to determine whether
a test image, X ∈ Zw×h×cq (q = 28 for images), held by
user C belongs to any of the N classes or none of them.
We aim to execute this classification while keeping X as well
as the parameters of the N one-class classifiers private. To
this end, we secret-share X with the service provider and the
regulator, and perform the private reconstruction of each one-
class classifier followed by dissimilarity based prediction.
First, we describe the MPC protocols that the service
provider and regulator use to securely perform the multi-
plication and non-linear L-ReLU activation function of the
reconstruction (see Figure 1). Then, we describe the prediction
based on the reconstruction dissimilarity.
5Compute additive shares of the
multiplication
Service provider RegulatorSecure 2PC
Compute additive shares of the
activation function
(Protocol 2)
(Protocol 3)
Figure 1. Our secure 2PC protocol for privately evaluating each layer of the
one-class reconstructor. Ws1 and Ws2 are secret shares of the parameters
and Xs1 and Xs2 are secret shares of the test image.
A. Private reconstruction
Recall that each Ri(·) consists of T layers, where each layer
is a linear transformation (i.e. matrix multiplications and ad-
ditions) followed by a nonlinear transformation (i.e. activation
function). To reduce the complexity of the prediction with
2PC, instead of using pooling layers, we use a convolutional
stride larger than one.
1) Input and parameters sharing: To blind the parameters
of all T layers of Ri(·), each user ui runs Protocol 1 T times
on their set of parameters, W ∗Ri . By running Protocol 1, each
user ui randomly generates a set of matrices with the same
size as the set of parameters
R = {Rt ∈ Zwk×hk×ct×ct+1q : t = 1, .., T},
which are sent to the service provider, s1,
W s1i = R,
and to the regulator, s2,
W s2i = W
∗
Ri −R.
Accordingly, s1 and s2 learn nothing about the parameters
W ∗Ri of each user ui, as no information about the actual pa-
rameters can be gained from the individual shares in isolation.
Moreover, as X may be a private image of one of the users,
we additively secret-share it among s1 and s2 by running
Protocol 1:
Xs1 = Rx, Xs2 = X−Rx,
where random Rx ∈ Zw×h×cq .
To reconstruct the image, s1 and s2 receive Xs1 ∈ Zw×h×c
and Xs2 ∈ Zw×h×c and compute X¯i = Ri(W ∗Ri ,X) in a
secure 2PC.
6Di is an auxiliary model for training that is not needed for prediction.
Protocol 1: Additive secret sharing
Input: a secret I ∈ Zw×hq (q is 28)
Output: Two additive secret shares S1 ∈ Zw×hq and
S2 ∈ Zw×hq
1: Generate random R ∈ Zw×hq .
2: Set secret shares
S1 = R and S2 = I−R.
Protocol 2: Multiplication
Parties: Service provider, s1, and regulator, s2
Input: Additive shares Xs1 ,Xs2 and additive shares
Ws1 ,Ws2 and additive shares of multiplication
triplets Q = UV
Output: Additive shares of
Z = (Xs1 + Xs2)(Ws1 + Ws2)
1: s1 masks its shares using Us1 and Vs1 :
Es1 = Xs1 −Us1 ,Fs1 = Ws1 −Vs1 .
2: s2 masks its shares using Us2 and Vs2 :
Es2 = Xs2 −Us2 ,Fs2 = Ws2 −Vs2 .
3: s1 recovers E and F by receiving Es2 and Fs2 from
s2:
E = Es1 + Es2 ,F = Fs1 + Fs2 .
4: s2 recovers E and F by receiving Es1 and Fs1 from
s1:
E = Es2 + Es1 ,F = Fs2 + Fs1 .
5: s1 sets Zs1 = FXs1 + EWs1 + Qs1 .
6: s2 sets Zs2 = −EF + FXs2 + EWs2 + Qs2 .
2) Private linear transformation: s1 and s2 perform the
linear transformation of each layer by running Protocol 2.
Protocol 2 takes advantage of Beaver’s precomputed multipli-
cation technique, similarly to SecureML [24], in which online
time of multiplying additively secret shares can be improved
by considering a data independent offline pre-computation.
More concretely, to compute each multiplication of the t-th
layer zt = (xs1t +x
s2
t )(w
s1
t +w
s2
t ), we assume that two random
values, ut and vt (and their product qt = utvt), are secret-
shared among s1 and s2 during an offline pre-computation
phase. s1 and s2 mask their shares by locally computing
es1t = x
s1
t − us1t , fs1t = ws1t − vs1t ,
and
es2t = x
s2
t − us2t , fs2t = ws2t − vs2t ,
respectively. Then s1 sends es1t and f
s1
t to s2, and s2 sends
es2t and f
s2
t to s1, and each locally reconstructs et and ft by
adding es1t , e
s2
t and f
s1
t , f
s2
t , respectively. Next, s1 computes
zs1t = ftx
s1
t + etw
s1
t + q
s1
t ,
and s2 computes
zs2t = −etft + ftxs2t + etws2t + qs2t .
At the end of these interactions, s1 and s2 hold Zs1t and
Zs2t , additive shares of the linear transformation’s output, Zt.
6Protocol 3: L-ReLU
Parties: Service provider, s1, and regulator, s2
Input: Additive shares Zs1 and Zs2 , and random R′
Output: Additive shares of H = L-ReLU(Zs1 + Zs2)
1: s1 and s2 create Boolean circuit C of L-ReLU fol-
lowed by an addition.
2: s1 garbles C.
3: s1 sends its garbled inputs, C and truth table to s2.
4: s2 receives garbled values correspondence to its input
via OT.
5: s2 evaluates the garbled C using its garbled input and
s1’s garbled input and compute garbled H−R′.
6: s1 sets Hs1 = R′.
7: s2 sets Hs2 = H−R′.
3) Private non-linear function: To compute the L-ReLU
activation function securely on each element z of z:
L-ReLU(z) =
{
z if z > 0
αz otherwise
(3)
and obtain a secret share of the output of each layer h, s1 and
s2 run Protocol 3, a Yao’s Garbled Circuit protocol [71] that
securely performs an L-ReLU activation function by repre-
senting it as a Boolean circuit, C. Our proposed functionality
of C includes a 2-input multiplexer, which chooses among the
reconstructed z and αz7 based on the first bit of z, denoted
z[1]8. Circuit C selects z if z[1] is zero, otherwise αz. Finally,
we perform another addition to obtain the secret shares of the
following layer:
Xs1t+1 = R
′, Xs2t+1 = Ht −R′,
which are the inputs of s1 and s2 for the next layer. This
process is repeated for all the layers of each Ri(·).
To perform the mentioned computation inside C securely,
as a garbler, s1 garbles C gate-by-gate. By garbling we
mean that s1 generates two random labels for each wire of
C and encrypts the output labels of each gate by using the
corresponding input labels as encryption keys. Then, s1 sends
to s2 the garbled C with garbled truth tables, which show all
possible garbled values that each gate can attain.
As an evaluator, s2 computes garbled C gate-by-gate from
the input wires to the output wires. s2 needs to know the
labels of their input and the s1 input prior to the computation.
s1 sends their input labels to s2 directly, as s2 cannot learn
the real input of s1 from its random label. However, s2 asks
the label of its input via Oblivious Transfer (OT) [72], which
guarantees that s2 only receives the label corresponding to
their input from s1, while s1 learns nothing from the input of
s2. In addition, neither s1 nor s2 learns intermediate values in
the clear. We refer the reader to [73] for a detailed presentation
and security analysis of Garbled Circuits.
7To construct shares of αz the parties only need to multiply their shares
by the public values α locally.
8As we use the common two’s complement encoding, z[1] corresponds to
the sign z.
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Figure 2. Computation of the reconstruction dissimilarity of each one-class
reconstructor Ri(·) with T layers in PrivEdge given an image X with L =
w×h×c pixels, where w, h and c are width, height and number of channels of
the image, respectively. The uploaded image X is passed through all T layers
of Ri(·) to produce the reconstructed image, X¯i. The output of each first layer,
H1i , is computed as the convolution ~ of the input of this layer, X, and
its corresponding parameters, W1Ri
, followed by L-ReLU activation function
f(·). Finally, the reconstruction dissimilarity, di, between the uploaded image
and the reconstructed image is measured as the sum square difference in each
first pixel, o1 = x(1)− x¯i(1), for example.
B. Dissimilarity based prediction
s1 and s2 hold secret shares of the input image, X, and the
reconstructed image, X¯. To classify X, s1 and s2 compute the
reconstruction dissimilarity (see Figure 2), di, between X and
X¯i (for each i = 1, ..., N ) and assign the image X to the class
corresponding to the minimum reconstruction dissimilarity (or
none of them if the smallest di is above a predefined secret-
shared threshold) by securely computing subtraction and mul-
tiplication in the Arithmetic circuit followed by computing the
minimum and comparison via Yao’s Garbled Circuit protocol.
In a social media application, if the assigned class differs
from the class of the user who uploaded image X and the
reconstruction dissimilarity is smaller than a privacy threshold,
then the image is blocked (i.e. not shared). In Section VI we
evaluate the effect of the privacy threshold with a specific
dissimilarity function.
Overall, the service provider and the regulator together
perform the private prediction of each one-class classifier using
different 2PC protocols for different operations to achieve
substantial gains in complexity and speed (see Figure 3). In
the choices of 2PC Protocols 1, 2 and 3, we leverage the
fact that non-linear transformations such as L-ReLU can be
represented efficiently as simple Boolean circuits, which are
best computed using Yao’s Garbled Circuit [46], while linear
transformations such as addition and multiplication have an
efficient representation as secure arithmetic circuits [24].
VI. VALIDATION
In this section, we discuss the evaluation of PrivEdge for
privacy-preserving MLaaS. We evaluate PrivEdge in recognis-
ing users from their faces, handwritten text and letters.
A. Datasets and Architecture
We consider three realistic privacy-sensitive scenarios with
the Internet Movie Data Base (IMDB) dataset [74], Informatics
and Applied Mathematics handwritten (IAM) dataset [75] and
Russian handwritten lowercase letters dataset [76]. Here, we
introduce the datasets and state-of-the-art multi-class classi-
fiers that are trained directly on them in a centralised manner
without considering privacy.
7Figure 3. The private prediction of each reconstructor by the service provider
s1 and regulator s2 for an image X. Each layer t is a multiplication between
the input, Xt, and the parameters, Wt, of this layer, Zt = XtWt, followed
by a L-ReLU activation function, Ht = L-ReLU(Zt). The parameters and
inputs of each layer t are secret-shared among s1 and s2 as X
s1
t , X
s2
t and
Ws1t , W
s2
t , respectively, to preserve their privacy. The input to the first
layer of the reconstructor is the user’s data, X, which is masked using a
random matrix R to be secret-shared among s1 and s2 (Protocol 1). To do the
private multiplication of each layer t, s1 and s2 locally mask their input and
parameters using their shares of random matrices U and V, and exchange
them to obtain their additive shares, Zs1t and Z
s2
t , and multiply them by
the public value α locally (Protocol 2). s1 and s2 engage in Protocol 3 to
privately perform the L-ReLU activation function, which is represented using
a Boolean circuit. This Boolean circuit includes a 2-input multiplexer (MUX)
that outputs Zt if its first bit, z[1], is zero, otherwise αZt. s1 sends the garbled
values of their inputs G via Oblivious transfer to the evaluator of the garbled
circuit, s2. In Oblivious transfer, for each i-th bit of the secret share of s2,
zs2 [i] = {0, 1}, s2 receives the garbled value Gzs2 [i] which equals to one
of two garbled messages m0 and m1 of s1 based on the value of zs2 [i]. s1
generates two random values (r0 and r1) and RSA keys (the modulus N and
the public exponent e) and sends them to s2. s2 chooses one of the random
values based on the value of their input and masks it by generating a random
value k, v = (rb +ke)modN . Then, s1 receives v and masks their messages
m′0 = m0 + k0 and m
′
1 = m1 + k1, where k0 = (v − x0)dmodN and
k1 = (v−x1)dmodN . One of k0 or k1 is equal to k. s2 receives the masked
messages and unmasks the corresponding message, G
zs2 [i] = m
′
zs2 [i] − k.
We also consider another addition after computing L-ReLU in the garbled
circuit to obtain the secret shares of the input of the next layer.
We adopted a subset of celebrities from the IMDB
dataset [74] as users. IMDB includes whole body images
with variations between images of each class, such as the
number of individuals within images, and their rotation, pose,
and illumination. We detect and crop the faces [77] to obtain
128 × 128 × 3 images. As an N -class classifier, we use
7 convolutional layers followed by 2 fully-connected layers
and a softmax layer 32C4-64C4-128C4-256C4-256C4-256C4-
256C4-256FC-256FC-NSM, where 32C5 is a convolutional
layer with 32 kernels of size 4×4, 256FC is a fully-connected
layer with size 256 and NSM is a softmax layer of size N
(the number of classes).
The IAM handwritten dataset [75] contains scanned pages of
handwritten English text. Each user ui collects their greyscale
pages of scanned text and break down the greyscale lines to
image size (128×128×1) without considering breaking them
with respect to sentences or words. As the width of the lines
are larger than their heights, and to keep the aspect ratio during
resizing, we first resize the height of the text to 128, followed
by resizing the width with the same height factor. Then, we
crop the text with size 128× 128 with random starting point
of width and select 0.1 of them. As proposed in [78], we
use a convolutional 10-class classifier 32C5-MP-64C3-MP-
128C3-MP-DO-512FC-DO-256FC-DO-10SM, where MP and
DO stand for Max Pooling and Drop Out.
Russian lowercase letters includes 33 classes of handwritten
Russian lowercase letters (32×32×3). The width and height
of the letters are smaller than the IMDB and IAM samples,
and so we use a shallower one-class classifier. As proposed
in [76], we use convolutional 33-class classifier 32C3-32C3-
DO-256FC-33SM.
B. PrivEdge: implementation details
In contrast to training an N -class classifier on a centralised
dataset, users train one-class RANs (T = 14) locally on
their private data (i.e. faces, handwritten texts or handwrit-
ten letters) using a mini-batch Adam optimizer [70] with
learning rate = 0.0002, γ = 0.999, and β = 0.001. The
reconstructor encoder and decoder both have seven layers for
IMDB and IAM, and six for the Russian lowercase letters
dataset. The discriminator of the RAN classifies data against
the reconstructed data through 5 convolutional layers, with
wk = hk = 4 (width and height of the kernel). L-ReLU is the
chosen activation function. The stride sizes of the encoder,
decoder and discriminator are 2, 1 and 2 respectively. The
training phases of the one-class RANs were implemented in
Python with the publicly available Keras library [79] on a
remote server with one NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPU. The training
uses several iterations, each with 32 randomly selected training
data samples. This random selection enables the model to see
all of the training images, while converging more quickly than
when using epochs and iterating through the entire dataset
within each epoch [80]. We used the ABY [81] library for
secure 2PC (i.e. additive secret-sharing and Garbled circuit)
with 128-bit security parameter and SIMD circuits running
the service provider and the regulator on an Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU E5-2690 v3 @ 2.60GHz parallel with 24 cores.
C. Evaluation measures
We measure accuracy9 (i.e. precision and recall) and execu-
tion times. In the specific implementation used for validation,
9We report accuracy using floating point training, while a trained floating
point model can be quantized to integers with negligible drop in accuracy
using post-training quantization [82].
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Figure 4. Per-user Recall and Precision (RP) of PrivEdge vs fully centralised non-private State-Of-the-Art (SOA) methods for recognition of user identity
(left), writer (middle) and handwritten Russian lowercase letters (right).
Table I
PREDICTION TIME (SECONDS) OF THE ONE-CLASS RECONSTRUCTOR FOR
IMDB [74], IAM [75] AND RUSSIAN LOWERCASE LETTERS [76].
Dataset Online Time Offline Time
IMDB 16 60
IAM 15 57
Letters 7 34
we defined the reconstruction dissimilarity of X and all of the
N reconstructed images as:
di =
w×h×c∑
l=1
||x(l)− x¯i(l)||22 ∀i = 1, 2, .., N, (4)
where x(l) and x¯i(l) are the l-th elements of image X and
the reconstructed image X¯ by Ri(·), respectively.
We consider precision and recall for the prediction of classes
for private data of each user ui as follows:
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
, (5)
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
, (6)
where the prediction of class i for ui’s private data is a True
Positive (TP); the prediction of any class different from i for
ui’s private data is a False Negative (FN); the prediction of
class i for private images of other users is a False Positive
(FP); and the prediction of any class but i for private images
of other users is a True Negative (TN). A conservative filter
tends to be sensitive and is more likely to reject images (high
FN rate), which results in low recall. A permissive filter tends
to incorrectly accept images (high FP rate), which leads to a
low precision.
We also measure the prediction and local training execution
times. The prediction time of PrivEdge includes an offline and
online phase. The service provider and the regulator first run
the offline data-independent phase to generate multiplication
triplets of Q = UV for all layers (see Section V). The
online classification of an image evaluates N reconstructors
Ri(·), which can be done in parallel as their predictions are
independent.
D. Accuracy, timing, scalability and robustness
The per-user recall and precision for IMDB, IAM and
Russian lowercase letters are shown in Figure 4. PrivEdge
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Figure 5. The effect of increasing the number of users on the recall and
precision of PrivEdge and the N -class classifier (average over 5
runs with random selection of celebrities as our users). The standard deviation
is lower than 0.006 for all.
performs as well as the state-of-the-art methods on IMDB
and Russian lowercase letters [76]. PrivEdge can effectively
distinguish handwritten texts of the users with the overall
recall and precision of 92% and 91%, respectively, although
its overall precision and recall degrades by 4% in comparison
to the state-of-the-art non-private method on IAM [78].
The training of each one-class RAN takes 10 minutes.
Table I presents the data-independent offline and online pre-
diction times of each one-class reconstructor for all datasets.
Prediction time measures the time of computing all linear
(e.g. addition and multiplication) and non-linear (e.g. L-ReLU)
functions during the prediction of a label for a given input.
The number of functions and their sizes depend on the input
dimension and on the size of the reconstructor, which depends
on the number of layers and dimension of each layer. The
dimension of the data in IMDB is 128× 128× 3, in IAM is
128×128×1 and in Russian lowercase letters is 32×32×3.
The reconstructors of IMDB and IAM have 14 layers, while
the reconstructor of Russian lowercase letters has 12 layers.
The lower the input dimension, the fewer the layers and the
lower the dimensionality of the layers of the reconstructors.
Among the three datasets, Russian lowercase letters has the
smallest dimension of data and, accordingly, the smallest
reconstructor, resulting in the fastest prediction time (almost
half of that of IMDB and IAM). The prediction time of IMDB
is 1 second more than that for IAM, as the input dimension of
IMDB is 3 times larger than that of the IAM input. In general,
performing multiplications is more expensive than computing
9IMDB users
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u6 u7 u8 u9 u10
Training data
Test data
Figure 6. Example face images in training and test data of the IMDB dataset. Each user only has access to the data of one class.
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Figure 7. The effect of the amount of training data on the per-user recall and
precision of the 10 randomly chosen users in Figure 6.
L-ReLU activation functions due to the large size of matrices.
The architecture of a centralised N -class classifier for
IMDB is chosen to have similar accuracy to PrivEdge when
the number of classes are 10. This selection helps us to fairly
compare the scalability of PrivEdge with a centralised N -class
classifier by increasing the number of users. Figure 5 compares
the classification part of PrivEdge (without the final privacy
decision) and of a centralised N -class classifier for up to 500
users. Increasing the number of users has a negligible effect on
the performance of the classifier, as the recall and precision
drop by less than 2.2 when the number of PrivEdge users
increases from 10 to 500. A possible reason for this may be
advantages of N one-class classifiers with regards to one N -
class classifier when N is large [57], [83].
To analyse the per-user performance, we consider a set of
10 random users from IMDB (see Figure 6) and have repeated
this experiment 5 times (Figure 5) to verify the low standard
deviation of precision and recall.
Figure 7 shows the per-user performance of the classifica-
tion part of PrivEdge on 10 random users from IMDB and
demonstrates that PrivEdge is robust to a training set that is
not consistent in the number of images of different users. The
size of the training set varies from 200 to 700.
The users whose numbers of training images are in the
range [500, 700] achieve a higher recall than those with 200
training images. More training data helps each user ui to
more accurately train their one-class classifier (i.e. smaller
reconstruction dissimilarity), which enables assigning class i
for the images belonging to ui more often (i.e. larger TP and
smaller FN). Increasing TP and decreasing FN give a higher
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Figure 8. The effect of the privacy threshold on the per-class recall/precision
of the global filter for users u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 , u5 ,
u6 , u7 , u8 , u9 , u10 (IMDB dataset). The privacy
threshold increases (from the top left) from 0.04 (top left) to 0.20 (bottom
right).
recall (see Equation 5). Moreover, the more accurate one-class
classifier of ui can reconstruct images of those users whose
classifiers are trained with few images, so it increases the
possibility of FP of predicting class i for images of others,
thus decreases the precision (based on Equation 6).
E. Privacy protection
The lower the privacy threshold the more images will be
classified as non-private, thus increasing the number of FNs.
Figure 8 shows the per-user precision and recall of blocking
private images by each Ri(·) when changing the privacy
threshold from 0.04 to 0.20 with intervals of length 0.01. It
can be seen that increasing the privacy threshold increases, as
expected, the recall.
We also consider the percentage of blocked non-private
images due to each individual one-class reconstructor, as a
function of the privacy threshold. The percentage of blocking
non-private images by the PrivEdge classifier due to each
one-class Ri(·) is the ratio between the number of non-
private images that are classified as private of user ui and
the total number of non-private images. We consider 3 sets of
images, p1, p2 and p3, from 2 non-private classes (i.e. different
or similar to the privacy-sensitive images). Sets p1 and p2
comprise the faces of two randomly chosen celebrities from
the IMDB dataset who have not participated in the training
of the filter. The other set, p3, contains images from the
ImageNet [84] Zebra class.
In Figure 9, we show the values of the privacy thresholds
that cause the blocking of 0% to 100% of non-private images.
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Figure 9. The cumulative blocking rate of non-private images (two non-registered faces p1 and p2, and Zebra p3) by one-class reconstructors, R1 ,
R2 , R3 , R4 , R5 , R6 , R7 , R8 , R9 , R10 . These images are uploaded by a user who did not participate in the
training.
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Figure 10. The reconstruction dissimilarities of 10 test and training faces of
user u5 by 10 one-class reconstructors, R1 , R2 , R3 , R4 , R5 , R6 , R7 ,
R8 , R9 , R10 .
For a specific privacy threshold, the number of blocked non-
private images of faces is larger than that of blocked non-
private Zebra images, as non-private images from p1 and p2
are more similar to the private images in the training data
than Zebra images. By adding the percentage of blocked
non-private images by the filter due to all of the one-class
reconstructors, we see all non-private images of faces are
blocked when the privacy threshold is 0.3. However, the same
occurs for Zebra images with a higher privacy threshold of
0.45. This confirms that trained one-class classifiers recon-
struct images that are similar to the training images with
lower reconstruction dissimilarities than images with different
structures.
Figure 5 and Figure 9 show that PrivEdge is accurate in
classifying and detecting private images uploaded by others
(i.e. it is conservative), yet it is permissive of a user uploading
their own private images and non-private images. Therefore,
the filter does not interfere with image-sharing when there are
no concerns of violating the privacy of others.
Figure 10 compares the reconstruction dissimilarities of 10
one-class reconstructors for 10 random test and training sam-
ples of a specific user’s face, u5. As expected, R5 reconstructs
both test and training sample faces of user u5 better than other
reconstructors.
F. Visual assessment and robustness to compression
To better illustrate both the reconstruction dissimilarity of
each trained reconstructor for images of different classes and
the advantages of one-class decomposition from an accuracy
perspective, we visualise the reconstructed images. Figure 11
shows the reconstructed images by 10 one-class reconstructors
for images of the 10 users in Figure 6. As expected, the best
reconstruction of each image is produced by its corresponding
reconstructor. In addition, we visualise the reconstruction of
several non-private images by 10 one-class reconstructors of
the filter in Figure 12. This shows the ability of PrivEdge to
distinguish private images from non-private images based on
the reconstruction dissimilarities.
Finally, as service providers use different image transcoding
techniques and users themselves may compress images at
different qualities, we test the robustness of the prediction to
different encodings and compression ratios. To this end, we
evaluate the robustness of PrivEdge, trained with original qual-
ity images, to images compressed at different JPEG quality
levels. Figure 13 shows that the impact of JPEG compression
on the performance of PrivEdge is negligible as the accuracy
only slightly changes when degrading the encoding quality
from 100 to 2.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed PrivEdge, a technique for privacy-preserving
MLaaS where training data, model parameters, and prediction
data of each user remain private during both training and
prediction. In PrivEdge, users locally and privately train an
instance of a one-class Reconstructive Adversarial Network
(RAN) as a one-class classifier. This one-class RAN describes
a set of private pre-selected images and learns to reconstruct
its training data. Then, for the prediction phase, a multi-class
classifier is aggregated in the cloud by leveraging a third
party (a regulator) that aids in the computation while learning
nothing about user data.
Future work includes extending the validation of PrivEdge
to different types of image manipulations and compositions,
such as private adversarial examples [85].
11
Figure 11. Examples of reconstructed private images. Each row shows the reconstruction of the (test) face of each user in Figure 6, by all the 10 one-class
reconstructors. The face of each user is reconstructed by their corresponding one-class reconstructor (diagonal) better than other one-class reconstructors.
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